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ABSTRACT
Recent studies in social media spam and automation provide
anecdotal argumentation of the rise of a new generation of
spambots, so-called social spambots. Here, for the first time,
we extensively study this novel phenomenon on Twitter and
we provide quantitative evidence that a paradigm-shift ex-
ists in spambot design. First, we measure current Twitter’s
capabilities of detecting the new social spambots. Later,
we assess the human performance in discriminating between
genuine accounts, social spambots, and traditional spam-
bots. Then, we benchmark several state-of-the-art tech-
niques proposed by the academic literature. Results show
that neither Twitter, nor humans, nor cutting-edge applica-
tions are currently capable of accurately detecting the new
social spambots. Our results call for new approaches capa-
ble of turning the tide in the fight against this raising phe-
nomenon. We conclude by reviewing the latest literature on
spambots detection and we highlight an emerging common
research trend based on the analysis of collective behaviors.
Insights derived from both our extensive experimental cam-
paign and survey shed light on the most promising directions
of research and lay the foundations for the arms race against
the novel social spambots. Finally, to foster research on this
novel phenomenon, we make publicly available to the scien-
tific community all the datasets used in this study.
1. INTRODUCTION
The widespread availability and ease of use of Online So-
cial Networks (OSN) have made them the ideal setting for
the proliferation of fictitious and malicious accounts [28]. In-
deed, recent work uncovered the existence of large numbers
of OSN accounts that are purposely created to distribute
unsolicited spam, advertise events and products of doubtful
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legality, sponsor public characters and, ultimately, lead to a
bias within the public opinion [15,23]. Moreover, the plague
of such spammers and bots leads to an ingenious and lucra-
tive “underground economy”, where account vendors, their
customers, and oblivious victims play a piece staging since
the very introduction of social networks [33,34,37].
One of the most fascinating peculiarities of spambots is
that they “evolve” over time, adopting sophisticated tech-
niques to evade early-established detection approaches, such
as those based on textual content of shared messages [24],
posting patterns [35] and social relationships [17]. As evolv-
ing spammers became clever in escaping detection, for in-
stance by changing discussion topics and posting activities,
researchers kept the pace and proposed complex models,
such as those based on the interaction graphs of the accounts
under investigation [20,43].
Noticeably, spambots evolution still goes on. Recent in-
vestigations anecdotally highlight how new waves of social
spambots are rising [15, 47]. In this paper, we target these
new waves, finding evidence of the difficulties for OSN users
to distinguish between genuine and malicious accounts. We
also highlight the difficulties for OSN administrators to take
appropriate countermeasures against the takeover of evolv-
ing spambots. Remarkably, a large number of tools and
techniques have been proposed by Academia to detect OSN
spambots [15, 23]. Until recently, such tools have proved to
be valid allies for spambots timely detection. Unfortunately,
the characteristics of the new wave of social spambots are
such that standard classification approaches, where a single
account is evaluated according to a set of established features
tested over known datasets, are no longer successful. In this
work, we demonstrate this claim by investigating the per-
formances of several state-of-the-art tools techniques when
struggling against the latest wave of social spambots. The
unsatisfactory results of the surveyed techniques call for new
approaches capable of turning the tide of this long-lasting
fight.
Interestingly, we assist to a paradigm-shift in modeling
and analyzing online accounts. Independently from each
other, new research efforts were born, which leverage charac-
teristics of groups of accounts – rather than those of a single
account – as a red flag for anomalous behaviors. We provide
a review of these prominent research directions, highlight-
ing the new dimensions to sound out for successfully fighting
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statistics
used in
dataset description accounts tweets year section
genuine accounts verified accounts that are human-operated 3,474 8,377,522 2011 3.1, 3.2
social spambots #1 retweeters of an Italian political candidate 991 1,610,176 2012 3.1, 3.2
social spambots #2 spammers of paid apps for mobile devices 3,457 428,542 2014 3.1, 3.2
social spambots #3 spammers of products on sale at Amazon.com 464 1,418,626 2011 3.1, 3.2
traditional spambots #1 training set of spammers used by Yang et al. in [43] 1,000 145,094 2009 3.1
traditional spambots #2 spammers of scam URLs 100 74,957 2014 3.1
traditional spambots #3 automated accounts spamming job offers 433 5,794,931 2013 3.2
traditional spambots #4 another group of automated accounts spamming job offers 1,128 133,311 2009 3.2
fake followers simple accounts that inflate the number of followers of another
account
3,351 196,027 2012 3.1
test set #1 mixed set of 50% genuine accounts + 50% social spambots #1 1,982 4,061,598 – 4, 5
test set #2 mixed set of 50% genuine accounts + 50% social spambots #3 928 2,628,181 – 4, 5
Table 1: Statistics about the datasets used for this study.
against this novel generation of spambots.
Contributions. Our main contributions are:
• We provide empirical evidence of the existence of a
novel wave of Twitter spambots, which, up to now,
has been just theorized [15].
• We evaluate if, and to which extent, state-of-the-art
detection techniques succeed in spotting such new spam-
bots.
• We critically revise an emerging stream of research,
which adopt features tied to groups of accounts rather
than individual accounts features.
• We leverage results of a crowdsourcing spambot de-
tection campaign for drawing new guidelines for the
annotation of datasets comprising social spambots.
• Finally, we publicly release to the scientific community
an annotated dataset1, consisting of genuine accounts,
traditional spambots, and —for the first time— the
novel social spambots.
2. DATASETS
We describe the different Twitter datasets that constitute
the real-world data used in our experiments. Table 1 re-
ports the name of the datasets, their brief description, and
the number of accounts and tweets they feature. The year
represents the average of the creation years of the accounts
that belong to the dataset.
The genuine accounts dataset is a random sample of gen-
uine (human-operated) accounts. We randomly contacted
Twitter users by asking a simple question in natural lan-
guage. All the replies to our questions were manually veri-
fied and all the 3,474 accounts that answered were certified
as humans. The accounts that did not answer to our ques-
tion were discarded and are not used in this study.
The social spambots #1 dataset was created after ob-
serving the activities of a novel group of social bots that
we discovered on Twitter during the last Mayoral election
in Rome, in 2014. One of the runners-up employed a so-
cial media marketing firm for his electoral campaign, which
made use of almost 1,000 automated accounts on Twitter to
publicize his policies. Surprisingly, we found such automated
1
http://mib.projects.iit.cnr.it/dataset.html
accounts to be similar to genuine ones in every way. Every
profile was accurately filled in with detailed – yet fake –
personal information such as a (stolen) photo, (fake) short-
bio, (fake) location, etc. Those accounts also represented
credible sources of information since they all had thousands
of followers and friends, the majority of which were gen-
uine users2. Furthermore, the accounts showed a tweeting
behavior that was apparently similar to those of genuine ac-
counts, with a few tweets posted every day, mainly quotes
from popular people, songs, and YouTube videos. However,
every time the political candidate posted a new tweet from
his official account, all the automated accounts retweeted
it in a time span of just a few minutes. Thus, the political
candidate was able to reach many more accounts in addition
to his direct followers and managed to alter Twitter engage-
ment metrics during the electoral campaign. Amazingly, we
also found tens of human accounts who tried to engage in
conversation with some of the spambots. The most com-
mon form of such human-to-spambot interaction was rep-
resented by a human reply to one of the spambot tweets
quotes. We also discovered a second group of social bots,
which we labeled social spambots #2, who spent several
months promoting the #TALNTS hashtag. Specifically, Talnts
is a mobile phone application for getting in touch with and
hiring artists working in the fields of writing, digital photog-
raphy, music, and more. The vast majority of tweets were
harmless messages, occasionally interspersed by tweets men-
tioning a specific genuine (human) account and suggesting
him to buy the VIP version of the app from a Web store.
Further, we uncovered a third group of social bots, social
spambots #3, which advertise products on sale on Ama-
zon.com. The deceitful activity was carried out by spam-
ming URLs pointing to the advertised products. Similarly
to the retweeters of the Italian political candidate, also this
family of spambots interleaved spam tweets with harmless
and genuine ones.
We exploited a Twitter crawler to collect data about all
the accounts we suspected to belong to the three groups of
social spambots. All the accounts collected in this process
have then undergone an internal manual verification phase
to certify their automated nature. Among all the distinct
retweeters of the Italian political candidate, 50.05% (991 ac-
counts) were certified as spambots. Similarly, 94.50% (3,457
2
This was made possible also by the adoption of social engineering
techniques, such as the photo of a young attractive woman as the
profile picture and the occasional posting of provocative tweets.
accounts
dataset total alive deleted suspended
genuine accounts 3,474 3,353 (96.5%) 115 (3.3%) 6 (0.1%)
social spambots #1 994 946 (95.2%) 2 (0.2%) 46 (4.6%)
social spambots #2 3,457 3,322 (96.1%) 1 (0.1%) 134 (3.8%)
social spambots #3 467 465 (99.6%) 2 (0.4%) 0 (0.0%)
traditional spambots #1 1,000 889 (88.9%) 25 (2.5%) 86 (8.6%)
traditional spambots #2 100 1 (1.0%) 0 (0.0%) 99 (99.0%)
fake followers 3,351 851 (25.4%) 38 (1.1%) 2,462 (73.5%)
Table 2: Statistics about alive, deleted, and suspended accounts, for different groups of genuine and malicious accounts.
accounts) of the accounts who tweeted the #TALNTS hash-
tag resulted as spambots. Finally, 89.29% (464 accounts)
of the accounts that tweeted suspicious Amazon.com URLs
were also certified as spambots. The three sets of accounts
represent our ground truth of novel social spambots.
Our internal manual annotation has been carried out by
comparing every account to all the others, in order to high-
light possible similarities and common behaviors. This is
in contrast with the typical annotation process where ac-
counts are labeled one-by-one and by solely exploiting the
characteristics of the account under investigation.
In addition to genuine users and social spambots, we also
collected several datasets of traditional spambots. Such
datasets are used throughout the paper as a strong base-
line. The traditional spambots #1 dataset is the training
set used in [43], kindly provided to us by the authors of that
work. In [43], the dataset has been used to train a machine
learning classifier for the detection of evolving Twitter spam-
bots. Accounts belonging to the traditional spambots #2
dataset are rather simplistic bots that repeatedly mention
other users in tweets containing scam URLs. To lure users
into clicking the malicious links, the content of their tweets
invite the mentioned users to claim a monetary prize. The
traditional spambots #3 and traditional spambots #4
datasets are related to 2 different groups of bots that re-
peatedly tweet about open job positions and job offers.
Fake followers are another kind of malicious accounts that
recently gained interest both from platform administrators
and from the scientific world [12]. Given that fake followers
are rather simplistic in their design and functioning, they
can serve as a weak baseline against which to compare so-
cial spambots. In April, 2013, we bought 3,351 fake accounts
from three different Twitter online markets, namely fastfol-
lowerz.com, intertwitter.com, and twittertechnology.com. All
the accounts acquired in this way have been merged in order
to obtain the fake followers dataset used in this study.
By considering a diverse set of spammer accounts we have
captured many of the different dimensions currently exploited
by spambots and tamperers to perpetrate their illicit activ-
ities. In detail, we have considered (i) fake follower frauds,
(ii) retweet frauds, (iii) hashtag promotion, (iv) URL spam-
ming, (v) scamming, and (vi) spam of generic messages.
3. REAL-WORLD EXPERIMENTATION
3.1 Twitter monitoring
A first assessment of the extent and the severity of Twit-
ter social spambots problem can be obtained by measuring
Twitter’s capacity of detecting and removing them from the
platform. This section thus answers the research question:
RQ1 – To what extent is Twitter currently capable of de-
tecting and removing social spambots?
Interesting insights can be gained by comparing the rate
at which Twitter accounts are removed, for different types
of malicious accounts. The intuition is that accounts that
are easily identified as malicious can be rapidly removed by
platform administrators. Thus, in this experiment, we let
different types of accounts behave for a rather long amount
of time (i.e., years). Then, we check whether Twitter man-
aged to identify such accounts as malicious and to remove
them from the platform. We perform this experiment on our
set of genuine accounts, on our 3 groups of social spambots,
on 2 groups of traditional spambots, and on the group of
fake followers.
In order to perform this experiment, we exploited Twit-
ter’s responses to API calls and, particularly, the Twitter er-
ror codes. Given a query to a specific account, Twitter’s API
replies with information regarding the status of the queried
account. Specifically, accounts that are suspected to perform
malicious activities get suspended by Twitter. API queries
to a suspended account result in Twitter responding with
the error code 63. API queries to accounts that have been
deleted by their original owner result in Twitter respond-
ing with the error code 50. Instead, for accounts that are
neither suspended nor deleted, Twitter replies with the full
metadata information of the account, without issuing error
codes. By exploiting this response mechanism, we were able
to measure the survivability of the different groups of ac-
counts. Results of this experiment are reported in Table 2
and are pictorially depicted in Figure 1.
As shown in Table 2, genuine accounts feature a very
high survival rate (96.5%). In addition, among the no longer
available accounts, the vast majority have been deleted by
the original owner, rather than suspended by Twitter. These
results are quite intuitive, by considering that legitimate ac-
counts rarely perform any kind of malicious activity. Con-
versely, the simplest kind of malicious accounts, fake fol-
lowers, have mostly been detected and suspended by Twit-
ter. The same also applies to one of the two groups of
traditional spambots, identified as traditional spambots
#2 in Table 2, which features a suspension rate as high as
99%. The most interesting results are however related to
those kinds of malicious accounts that better mimic human
behaviors. So far, traditional spambots #1 have largely
managed to evade suspension, despite dating back to 2009.
Indeed, only 8.6% of the bots have been suspended, while
88.9% of them are still alive. This seems to suggest that
Twitter’s spambot detection mechanisms are still unable to
accurately identify such accounts, while recent solutions pro-
posed by Academia have succeeded in this task [43]. Twit-
Figure 1: Survival rates for different types of accounts.
ter’s performance in suspending malicious accounts is even
worse if we consider social spambots. All the 3 groups of so-
cial spambots feature very high survival rates, respectively
95.2%, 96.1%, and 99.6%. Even if the difference between the
survival rate of social spambots and that of traditional
spambots #1 is marginal, these results nonetheless suggest
an increased difficulty for the detection of social spambots.
Table 3 also reports the results of a comparison between
the ratios of alive, deleted, and suspended accounts between
spambots and genuine accounts. As shown, social spam-
bots feature very small differences with respect to genuine
accounts (∼ ±3%). Some of these differences are not even
statistically significant, according to a chi-square test. Tra-
ditional spambots #1 have differences ∼ ±8% that are
highly significant (p < 0.01) for alive and suspended ac-
counts. Instead, traditional spambots #2 and fake fol-
lowers show massive differences: ∼ ±96% and ∼ ±72%,
respectively.
Figure 1 shows results of the survivability experiment,
with respect to the account age3. This can allow to un-
derstand if temporal patterns exist in the way malicious
accounts are created, and if Twitter’s mechanisms for sus-
pending malicious accounts are related to an account’s age.
For instance, Twitter might be better in detecting and sus-
pending older accounts than newer ones. However, this hy-
pothesis can be ruled out by considering that 99% of tradi-
tional spambots #2 accounts have been suspended despite
being younger than most of the social spambots. Overall, an
analysis of Figure 1 shows that account suspensions seem to
depend on the type of the account, its design and behavior,
rather than on its age.
Results reported in this first experiment already reveal
interesting differences between social spambots, traditional
spambots, and fake followers. Notably, social spambots ap-
pear to be more similar to genuine accounts than to tradi-
tional spambots, with regards to Twitter suspensions.
3
Account age is computed as the number of days between the ac-
count’s creation date and the day we performed the experiment.
accounts
dataset alive deleted suspended
social spambots #1 −1.3%* −3.1%*** +4.5%***
social spambots #2 −0.4% −3.2%*** +3.7%***
social spambots #3 +3.1%*** −2.9%*** −0.1%
traditional spambots #1 −7.6%*** −0.8% +8.7%***
traditional spambots #2 −95.5%*** −3.3% +98.9%***
fake followers −71.1%*** −2.2%*** +73.4%***
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 3: Effect size and statistical significance of the
difference between the survivability results of malicious
accounts with respect to those of genuine accounts.
3.2 Crowdsourcing: tasks and results
This section addresses the following research questions:
RQ2 – Do humans succeed in detecting social spambots
in the wild?
RQ3 – Do they succeed in discriminating between tradi-
tional spambots, social spambots, and genuine accounts?
Even if Twitter users were generally capable of distin-
guishing between traditional spambots and genuine accounts,
they might still find it difficult to spot social spambots in
the wild. If confirmed, this would provide additional evi-
dence of the evolutionary step characterizing the new social
spambots with respect to traditional ones.
Figure 2: Dataset for the crowdsourcing experiment.
To answer these research questions, we asked a large set
of real-world users to classify the accounts in our datasets.
To obtain a large and diverse set of users, we recruited con-
tributors from the CrowdFlower4 crowdsourcing platform.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 4,428 accounts that
we have employed for this crowdsourcing experiment, picked
up from the datasets in Section 2. Contributors were asked
to assign to each account one of the following classes: (i)
spambot, (ii) genuine, and (iii) unable to classify. The lat-
ter class (iii) has been inserted to deal with Twitter accounts
possibly getting deleted, suspended, or protected5 while our
crowdsourcing task was ongoing.
Notably, our experiment marks a difference with those
typically carried out with crowdsourcing. In fact, crowd-
sourcing tasks are typically aimed at creating a ground truth
(i.e., labeled) dataset for later use. For instance, crowdsourc-
ing is often used to create large training-sets for machine
learning algorithms. Here, instead, the datasets are labeled
in advance. Thus, by asking contributors to (re-)classify our
datasets, we are actually evaluating their ability to spot the
different types of accounts.
4
https://www.crowdflower.com/
5
Protected accounts are those accounts whose tweets and timeline are
not publicly visible.
detection results
type accounts] TP TN FP FN Accuracy Fleiss’ kappa (κ)
traditional spambots 1,516 1,385 0 0 131 0.9136 0.007
social spambots 1,393 328 0 0 1,065 0.2355 0.186
genuine accounts 1,377 0 1,267 110 0 0.9201 0.410
]: The total number of accounts considered is 4,286 instead of 4,428 because 142 accounts (3.2%) got
deleted, suspended, or protected during our campaign.
Table 4: Results of the crowdsourcing campaign on spambots detection.
Enforcing results reliability. We only recruited contrib-
utors who were tech-savvy and Twitter users themselves, in
order to be reasonably sure about their knowledge of Twitter
and its dynamics. Furthermore, we required each account
to be classified by at least 3 different contributors, with the
final class decided by majority voting. We also fixed to 100
the upper threshold of the number of accounts that a single
contributor could classify. In this way, we have obtained re-
dundant results from a broad set of contributors. Then, in
order to further guarantee the reliability of our crowdsourc-
ing results, we designed a set of “test” (or “gold”) questions
aimed at evaluating the quality of contributors’ answers. A
test question is one for which the correct answer is already
known by the system. Within the crowdsourcing platform,
such questions are indistinguishable from standard ones and
are randomly mixed among all the questions, so that contrib-
utors cannot know whether they are answering to a test or to
a standard question. Contributors’ answers to test questions
were checked against the known correct answers. Only the
trusted contributors who answered correctly to more than
the 70% of the test questions have been considered in our
study. Our test questions consist of accounts whose nature is
“easily” recognizable, and specifically: (i) a set of traditional
spambots sampled from the dataset of Yang et al. [43], (ii)
a subset of genuine accounts, and (iii) a set of suspended,
deleted, and protected accounts. Notably, by designing test
questions with traditional spambots and genuine accounts,
and by enforcing the policy of at least 70% correct answers,
we can guarantee that all our trusted contributors are typi-
cally able to detect traditional spambots and to distinguish
them from genuine accounts. This further strengthens the
results of their classification of the novel social spambots.
Table 5 shows a recap of the settings used in our crowd-
sourcing campaign. The thorough description of our cam-
paign, with the complete set of instructions, a list of exam-
ple accounts, and the task preview, is available online6. The
campaign completed when each of the 4,428 accounts was
classified by 3 different trusted contributors.
Num. accounts to classify 4,428
Min. contributors per account 3
Max. answers per contributor 100
Num. test questions 25
Min. accuracy threshold 70%
Reward 0.1 US$ per 5 accounts classified
Table 5: Crowdsourcing campaign settings.
Results of the crowdsourcing campaign. Overall, we
collected 13,284 answers given by 247 trusted contributors
from 42 different countries. Figure 3(a) shows the distribu-
tion of answers per country. Figure 3(b) depicts the distri-
bution of answers per contributor. CrowdFlower also gives
6
http://wafi.iit.cnr.it/fake/fake/crowdflower/instructions/
Instructions clear 4.0 / 5
Test questions fair 3.5 / 5
Ease of job 3.5 / 5
Pay 3.8 / 5
Overall 3.7 / 5
Table 6: Contributors’ evaluation of our campaign.
(a) Top 20 countries. (b) Answers per contributor.
Figure 3: Crowdsourcing campaign details.
contributors the possibility to evaluate crowdsourcing cam-
paigns for: (i) clarity of instructions, (ii) fairness of the test
questions, (iii) ease of the task, and (iv) appropriateness
of the payment. Out of the 247 participating contributors,
60 of them (∼ 24%) evaluated our campaign, leading to a
convincing aggregated score of 3.7/5, as shown in detail in
Table 6. Our campaign costed us 410 US$ in total.
The most interesting results of our crowdsourcing cam-
paign are undoubtedly related to the detection performance
of our human contributors. As reported in Table 4, overall,
the human annotators obtained an accuracy of less than 0.24
on the social spambots, with more than 1,000 False Nega-
tives (FN), meaning that contributors classified more than
1,000 accounts as genuine, when they actually belonged to
the dataset of the last generation of spambots. Human de-
tection performances for the two other groups of accounts,
namely traditional spambots and genuine accounts, are in-
stead quite satisfactory, with an accuracy of 0.91 and 0.92
respectively. These important results further highlight the
existence of a striking difference between traditional and so-
cial spambots. More worryingly, they also suggest that hu-
mans might not be able to detect social spambots in the
wild, and to distinguish them from genuine accounts.
Given that each account under investigation has been clas-
sified by at least 3 different contributors, we have also com-
puted the Fleiss’ kappa (κ) inter-rater agreement metric [19].
All inter-rater agreement metrics measure the level of agree-
ment of different annotators on a task. The level of agree-
ment can be also interpreted as a proxy for the difficulty
of a task. In our experiment, human contributors showed a
detection results
technique type Precision Recall Specificity Accuracy F-Measure MCC
test set #1
Twitter countermeasures mixed 1.000 0.094 1.000 0.691 0.171 0.252
Human annotators manual 0.267 0.080 0.921 0.698 0.123 0.001
BotOrNot? [14] supervised 0.471 0.208 0.918 0.734 0.288 0.174
C. Yang et al. [43] supervised 0.563 0.170 0.860 0.506 0.261 0.043
Miller et al. [30] unsupervised 0.555 0.358 0.698 0.526 0.435 0.059
Ahmed et al. [2]] unsupervised 0.945 0.944 0.945 0.943 0.944 0.886
Cresci et al. [13] unsupervised 0.982 0.972 0.981 0.976 0.977 0.952
test set #2
Twitter countermeasures mixed 1.000 0.004 1.000 0.502 0.008 0.046
Human annotators manual 0.647 0.509 0.921 0.829 0.570 0.470
BotOrNot? [14] supervised 0.635 0.950 0.981 0.922 0.761 0.738
C. Yang et al. [43] supervised 0.727 0.409 0.848 0.629 0.524 0.287
Miller et al. [30] unsupervised 0.467 0.306 0.654 0.481 0.370 -0.043
Ahmed et al. [2]] unsupervised 0.913 0.935 0.912 0.923 0.923 0.847
Cresci et al. [13] unsupervised 1.000 0.858 1.000 0.929 0.923 0.867
]: Modified by employing fastgreedy instead of MCL for the graph clustering step.
Table 7: Comparison among the spambot detection techniques, tools, and algorithms surveyed in this study. For each
test set, the highest values in each evaluation metric are shown in bold.
decent agreement for the classification of genuine accounts,
with κ = 0.410. Instead, they showed very little agree-
ment while classifying traditional spambots, as represented
by κ = 0.007. This interesting result shows that, overall,
the human contributors were able to correctly detect tra-
ditional spambots, as shown by the 0.91 accuracy, but also
that contributors rarely agreed on the class. Surprisingly, we
measured a slightly higher agreement for the classification
of social spambots than for traditional ones, with κ = 0.186.
These results imply that humans generally failed in classify-
ing social spambots (accuracy = 0.2355) and, furthermore,
that they also were more in agreement on this mistake than
they were when (correctly) classifying traditional spambots.
Annotation guidelines for spambots detection. De-
spite the recent advances in machine learning-based detec-
tion systems, manual verification of accounts to assess their
degree of automation is still carried out by platform adminis-
trators [15]. In [41], it is reported that human experts “con-
sistently produced near-optimal results” on a dataset of tra-
ditional spambots. However, the results of our crowdsourc-
ing experiment confirmed that the traditional “account-by-
account” annotation process used by human workers to eval-
uate social media accounts is no longer viable when applied
to the detection of the novel wave of social spambots. Given
the importance of manual annotation for the creation of
ground-truth datasets and for double-checking suspicious ac-
counts on social networking platforms, we call for the adop-
tion of new annotation methodologies that take into account
the similarities and synchronized behaviors of the accounts.
We have adopted a practical implementation of this method-
ology to annotate our datasets of social spambots. In par-
ticular, we have compared the timelines of large groups of
accounts, in order to highlight tweeting similarities among
them. By comparing the behaviors of different accounts,
rather than by analyzing them one by one, we were able to
spot the social spambots among all the collected accounts,
as thoroughly described in Section 2. Therefore, we envisage
the possibility to adopt this methodology, as well as similar
ones, in order to safeguard the manual annotation process
from elusive social spambots.
4. ESTABLISHED TECHNIQUES
So far, we have demonstrated that neither Twitter nor
human operators are currently capable of identifying novel
social spambots. Here, we investigate whether established
tools and techniques are able to succeed in this task. Thus,
our research question is:
RQ4 – Are state-of-the-art scientific applications and tech-
niques able to detect social spambots?
The BotOrNot? service. BotOrNot? is a publicly-
available service7 to evaluate the similarity of a Twitter ac-
count with the known characteristics of social spambots [14].
It has been developed by the Indiana University at Bloom-
ington and it was released in May 2014. Claimed capable of
detecting social spambots [15], at the time of writing it was
the only publicly-available social spambot detection system.
BotOrNot? leverages a supervised machine-learning classi-
fier that exploits more than 1,000 features of the Twitter
account under investigation. Specifically, it employs off-the-
shelf supervised learning algorithms trained with examples
of both humans and bots behaviors, based on the Texas
A&M dataset [25] with 15,000 examples of each class and
millions of tweets. Similarly to most already established
techniques, BotOrNot? performs its analyses on an account-
by-account basis. Despite being specifically designed for the
detection of social spambots, authors state that the detec-
tion performances of BotOrNot? against evolved spambots
might be worse than those reported in [14]. Here, we aim
at evaluating this point by querying the BotOrNot? service
with our sets of genuine and social spambot accounts. As
shown in Table 7, BotOrNot? achieves rather unsatisfactory
results for the accounts of both test set #1 and test set
#2 (such datasets are described in Table 1). Its detection
performances are particularly bad for the accounts of test
set #1 – where the spambots are from the social spambots
#1 group. The low values of F-Measure and Mathews Corre-
lation Coefficient (MCC), respectively 0.288 and 0.174, are
mainly due to the low Recall. In turn, this represents a ten-
dency of labeling social spambots #1 as genuine accounts.
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Supervised spambot classification. Among the many
supervised classification approaches to spambot detection
proposed in recent years by Academia, we decided to ex-
periment with the one presented by C. Yang et al. in [43],
since it focuses on the detection of evolving Twitter spam-
bots. Thus, it is interesting to evaluate if the system recently
presented in [43] is actually able to detect the sophisticated
social spambots. This supervised system provides a machine
learning classifier that infers whether a Twitter account is
genuine or spambot by relying on account’s relationships,
tweeting timing and level of automation. We have repro-
duced such a classifier by implementing and computing all
the features proposed in [43], and by training the classifier
with its original dataset. Results in Table 7 show that the
system fails to correctly classify the novel social spambots.
Similarly to the results of the BotOrNot? service, the worst
results of this system in both test set #1 and test set
#2 are related to the Recall metric. This means that also
this classifier labeled social spambots as genuine accounts.
Unsupervised spambot detection via Twitter stream
clustering. Our initial claim, supported by preliminary
work [15, 47], is that social spambots might be so sophisti-
catedly designed to make it very difficult to distinguish them
from genuine accounts, if observed one by one. If demon-
strated, this claim would imply that supervised classifica-
tion approaches are intrinsically worse than unsupervised
ones for the detection of social spambots. For this reason,
we have also experimented with unsupervised approaches
for spambot detection. The approach in [30] considers vec-
tors made of 126 features extracted from both accounts and
tweets as input of modified versions of the DenStream [7]
and StreamKM++ [1] clustering algorithms, to cluster fea-
ture vectors of a set of unlabeled accounts. We have imple-
mented the system proposed in [30] to cluster the accounts of
our 2 test sets. As shown in Table 7, this achieved the worst
performances among all those that we have benchmarked in
this study. Low values of both Precision and Recall mean
incomplete and unreliable spambot detection. Among the
126 features, 95 are based on the textual content of tweets.
However, novel social spambots tweet contents similar to
that of genuine accounts (e.g., retweets of genuine tweets
and famous quotes). For this reason, an approach almost
solely based on tweet content will not be able to achieve
satisfactory results.
Unsupervised spambot detection via graph cluster-
ing. The approach in [2] exploits statistical features related
to URLs, hashtags, mentions and retweets. Feature vectors
generated in this way are then compared with one another
via an Euclidean distance measure. Distances between ac-
counts are organized in an adjacency matrix, which is later
used to construct an undirected weighted graph of the ac-
counts. Then, graph clustering and community detection
algorithms are applied in order to identify groups of similar
accounts. Graph clustering is done by employing the Markov
cluster algorithm (MCL) [38]. We fully implemented this so-
lution and we experimented with our datasets. However, the
approach failed to identify 2 distinct clusters, since accounts
of both our test-sets were assigned to a single cluster. We
also performed a grid search simulation in order to test the
best parameter configuration for MCL8, but to no avail. To
achieve effective detection results, instead of the MCL, we
8
MCL admits 2 fundamental parameters: inflation and expansion.
established work emerging trends
Yardi, Romero et al. [45] 2009 Beutel, Faloutsos,
et al. [5, 18,21,22]
2013-16
Benevenuto et al. [3, 4, 17] 2009-12 Cao et al. [9] 2014
K. Lee, Caverlee
et al. [24,25]
2010-11 Yu et al. [46] 2015
Stringhini et al. [33–35] 2010-13 Viswanath, Mislove,
Gummadi et al. [40]
2015
Viswanath, Mislove,
Gummadi et al. [39]
2011 Cresci et al. [13] 2016
Stein et al. [32] 2011
Thomas et al. [36] 2011
Gao et al. [16] 2012
Cao et al. [8] 2012
Xie et al. [42] 2012
C. Yang et al. [43] 2013
Wang et al. [41] 2013
S. Lee et al. [26,27] 2013-14
Z. Yang et al. [44] 2014
Liu et al. [29] 2014
Paradise et al. [31] 2014
Cresci et al. [11,12] 2014-15
Ferrara et al. [6, 14] 2014-16
This table does not aim to be complete, but rather to testify the
emergence of a new trend of research.
Table 8: Recent work in spambot detection.
adopted the fastgreedy community detection algorithm [10].
As reported in Table 7, our modified implementation proved
effective in detecting social spambots, with an MCC = 0.886
for test set #1 and MCC = 0.847 for test set #2.
5. EMERGING TRENDS
As shown in Table 7, the established works benchmarked
in Section 4 largely failed to detect the new wave of so-
cial spambots. In turn, these results call for novel analytic
tools able to keep pace with the latest evolutionary step of
spambots. Thus, in this section we revise the most recent
literature on spambots detection with the aim of answering
the research question:
RQ5 – Is it possible to find a new dimension over which
to fight and overcome the novel social spambots?
Traditional spambot detection systems typically rely on
the application of well-known machine learning algorithms
on the accounts under investigation. However, since 2013,
a number of research teams independently started to for-
malize new approaches for detecting the coordinated and
synchronized behavior that characterizes groups of auto-
mated malicious accounts [5]. Table 8 groups such tech-
niques as emerging trends. Despite being based on different
key concepts, these studies investigate groups of accounts as
a whole, marking a significant difference with the previous
literature. Table 9 reports on the new concepts introduced
by these emerging works. Focusing on groups has the ad-
vantage that, no matter how sophisticated a single spambot
can be, a large enough group of spambots will still leave
traces of automation, since they do have a common goal
(e.g., increasing someone’s reputation score). By perform-
ing analyses at the group level, this emerging trend might
be able to significantly raise the bar for social spambots to
evade detection. To support the claim, we experiment with
work in [13,40].
Tamper Detection in Crowd Computations. The con-
tribution by Viswanath et al. in [40] checks whether a given
group of accounts (e.g., retweeters of another account, re-
viewers of a venue on Yelp) contains a subset of malicious
work key concept
Beutel, Faloutsos et al. [5, 21] detection of lockstep behaviors
Beutel, Faloutsos et al. [18,22] anomalies in synchronicity and
normality
Cao et al. [9] detection of loosely synchro-
nized actions
Yu et al. [46] detection of latent group
anomalies in graphs
Viswanath, Mislove, Gummadi
et al. [40]
distance between distributions
of reputation scores
Cresci et al. [13] similarity between digital DNA
sequences
Table 9: Key concepts of emerging trends.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Distribution of join date, number of followers
and LCS for genuine and social spambots accounts.
accounts. The intuition behind the methodology is that the
statistical distribution of reputation scores (e.g., number of
friends and followers) of the accounts participating in a tam-
pered computation significantly diverge from that of untam-
pered ones. The detection of a tampered computation is per-
formed by computing the Kullback-Leibler distance between
the statistical distribution of a given reputation score for the
computation under investigation with that of a reference –
untampered – computation. If such a distance exceeds a
given threshold, the computation under investigation is la-
beled as tampered. To test this technique against social
spambots, we have computed the statistical distribution of
the two reputation scores used in [40] (join date and num-
ber of followers) for the genuine and the social spambots
accounts of our datasets. The results are in figures 4(a)
and 4(b). Whereas the genuine accounts feature distribu-
tions that almost uniformly span across the possible range of
values, social spambots have anomalous distributions. Thus,
the technique proposed in [40] is capable of spotting the dif-
ferences between groups of genuine accounts and the new
wave of social spambots. However, the technique cannot
directly spot the tampering accounts, and, thus, detection
and removal of the single accounts must be performed using
a separate methodology.
Digital DNA for social spambots detection. Similarly
to [40], the technique in [13] analyses a group of accounts,
for detecting possible spambots among them. Authors in-
troduced a bio-inspired technique to model online users be-
haviors by so-called “digital DNA” sequences. Extracting
digital DNA for an account means associating that account
to a string that encodes its behavioral information. Digital
DNA sequences are then compared between one another to
find anomalous similarities among sequences of a subgroup
of accounts. The similarity among digital DNA sequences is
computed in [13] by measuring the Longest Common Sub-
string (LCS)—that is, the longest DNA substring shared by
all the accounts of the group. Accounts that share a suspi-
ciously long DNA substring are then labeled as spambots.
Notably, although working at group level, [13] is capable of
spotting single spambot accounts. For this reason, we have
been able to compare this technique with the ones previ-
ously benchmarked in Table 7. Applying the technique to
our datasets, the similarity curve of genuine accounts is sig-
nificantly different from that of social spambots, as shown
in Figure 4(c). More specifically, as measured by the LCS
metric, social spambots #1 and #3 feature a level of sim-
ilarity much higher than that of genuine accounts. Results
reported in Table 7 demonstrate that the digital DNA-based
technique [13] achieves excellent detection performances.
The compelling features of the emerging techniques listed
in this section represent a fertile ground for fighting the
novel social spambots. We can observe a paradigm-shift
for research and development of spambot detection systems,
which may exploit such new concepts to achieve better re-
silience and robustness, to withstand the next evolution of
social media spambots.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our long-lasting experiment on malicious accounts sur-
vival rate in Twitter demonstrated that spambot detection
is still an open issue. Moreover, the already difficult prob-
lem to detect spambots in social media is bound to worsen,
since the emergence of a new wave of so-called social spam-
bots. By accurately mimicking the characteristics of gen-
uine users, these spambots are intrinsically harder to detect
than those studied by Academia in the past years. In our
experiments, neither humans nor state-of-the-art spambot
detection applications managed to accurately detect the ac-
counts belonging to this new wave of spambots. Indeed, our
experiments highlighted that the majority of existing au-
tomated systems, as well as crowdsourcing, erroneously la-
bel social spambots as genuine (human-operated) accounts.
We demonstrated the need for novel analytic tools capable
of turning the tide in the arms race against such sophis-
ticated spambots. One promising research direction stems
from the analysis of collective behaviors. We highlighted a
few emerging approaches that analyze groups as a whole,
rather than individuals. The promising outcome of these
novel approaches clearly indicates that this is a favorable
research avenue.
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